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CONSTITUTIONAL SECRECY:
ALIGNING NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER
NONDISCLOSURE PROVISIONS WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
BRIAN D. EYINK†
ABSTRACT
First created in the 1980s, national security letters and their
nondisclosure provisions evaded judicial review until 2004. These
secretive investigative tools allow federal agencies such as the FBI to
compel disclosure of information about hundreds of thousands of
people while also allowing the same agencies to unilaterally issue gag
orders that can silence the people who receive these letters. This Note
examines the nondisclosure provisions in the national security letter
statutes. It argues that the nondisclosure provisions are
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and content-based speech
restrictions. This Note then proposes a three-part solution that
constitutionally balances the government’s need to protect national
security with its citizens’ rights to freedom of speech.

INTRODUCTION
Three years ago, I received a national security letter (NSL) in my
capacity as the president of a small Internet access and consulting
business. The letter ordered me to provide sensitive information
about one of my clients. There was no indication that a judge had
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reviewed or approved the letter, and it turned out that none had.
The letter came with a gag provision that prohibited me from telling
anyone, including my client, that the FBI was seeking this
information. Based on the context of the demand — a context that
the FBI still won’t let me discuss publicly — I suspected that the FBI
was abusing its power and that the letter sought information to
which the FBI was not entitled.
....
Living under the gag order has been stressful and surreal. Under
the threat of criminal prosecution, I must hide all aspects of my
involvement in the case — including the mere fact that I received an
NSL — from my colleagues, my family and my friends. When I meet
with my attorneys I cannot tell my girlfriend where I am going or
where I have been. I hide any papers related to the case in a place
where she will not look. When clients and friends ask me whether I
am the one challenging the constitutionality of the NSL statute, I
1
have no choice but to look them in the eye and lie.

Each year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) secretly
sends tens of thousands of national security letters (NSLs) to
communication providers and financial institutions requiring them to
turn over customer records and admonishing them not to reveal that
2
anything happened. These letters have existed in one form or
another since the 1980s, but the Patriot Act expanded their reach,
made them easier to obtain, and turned them into one of the FBI’s
3
favorite investigative tools. The anonymous NSL recipient who
recounted the story above is far from alone—the FBI issued more

1. Anonymous, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at
A17.
2. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 120 (2007)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf
(“After the Patriot Act, the number of NSL requests increased to approximately 39,000 in 2003,
approximately 56,000 in 2004, and approximately 47,000 in 2005.”).
3. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT
AMENDMENTS 5 (2007), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf (“The [Patriot Act]
amendments allowed NSL authority to be employed more quickly (without the delays
associated with prior approval from FBI headquarters) and more widely (without requiring that
the information pertain to a foreign power or its agents).”).
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than 143,000 NSL requests between 2003 and 2005. By 2005, the FBI
was using NSLs in approximately 29 percent of its counterterrorism
5
investigations. NSLs are issued to individuals, not just businesses;
thousands of American citizens have thus suffered the same fear and
uncertainty as the anonymous writer. Moreover, they cannot even
discuss NSLs with the American public.
NSL statutes have become quite controversial and raise
6
numerous First and Fourth Amendment concerns. Critics claim that
these provisions violate privacy and autonomy, that the gag orders
are unconstitutional restraints on speech, and that the judicial review
mechanism unconstitutionally dictates a lower standard of review
7
than the First Amendment requires. Scholarship on NSLs has tended
8
to either focus on Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure concerns
or address NSLs as part of a broader critique of the nation’s
9
counterterrorism and foreign-intelligence programs. Although these

4. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 120.
5. Id.
6. See Zachary D. Shankman, Note, Devising a Constitutional National Security Letter
Process in Light of Doe v. Ashcroft, 94 GEO. L.J. 247, 251 (2005) (“[T]he contentious provisions
of the Act involve broad investigative powers, veiled in secrecy, accorded to the government in
the name of national security. Arguably, the broadest of these powers is the National Security
Letter.”); id. at 256 (“[T]hese Fourth and First Amendment concerns provide the foundation for
striking down [an NSL provision] . . . .”).
7. E.g., ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, UNPATRIOTIC
ACTS: THE FBI’S POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS
WITHOUT TELLING YOU 7 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/spies_report.pdf
(“[NSLs] violate[] privacy and due process rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, and
free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and
National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 813 (2007) (“Academics and advocates
alike have denounced these [NSL] secrecy rules as poor public policy, not to mention affronts to
various constitutional guarantees.”); Shankman, supra note 6, at 259 (“Not only does the NSL
process implicate a subscriber’s right to privacy, free speech, and anonymous association, but it
also affects the recipient’s First Amendment rights. The categorical and indefinite disclosure ban
is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interests, and it causes an undue burden on
service providers.”).
8. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 86–92 (2006) (describing the evolution of NSLs
and their Fourth Amendment implications); Lauren M. Weiner, Comment, “Special” Delivery:
Where Do National Security Letters Fit into the Fourth Amendment?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1453, 1469–75 (2006) (arguing that NSLs violate the Fourth Amendment in a number of ways).
9. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1108–18 (2006) (describing the evolution of NSLs, but in the broader
context of Anglo-American security law); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications
Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 301–05 (2008) (discussing the government’s reporting
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criticisms deserve lively debate, scholars have not yet carefully
scrutinized the First Amendment concerns that NSLs’ troubling
nondisclosure provisions raise. Scholars evaluating NSLs have thus
not found an appropriate balance between the government’s secrecy
interest and citizens’ First Amendment rights.
This Note examines NSL nondisclosure provisions in light of
First Amendment guarantees and concludes that the provisions are
unconstitutional prior restraints and content-based restrictions on
speech. Part I discusses the use and structure of the various NSL
provisions. Part II applies established First Amendment law to the
NSL nondisclosure provisions and identifies three significant
constitutional shortcomings: First, the nondisclosure provisions
restrain speech without providing the proper procedural safeguards to
ensure prompt and fair judicial review. Second, the provisions vest
too much discretion with the issuing authority, which risks
inconsistent and arbitrary application of the nondisclosure provisions.
Third, the provisions authorize gag orders that are not narrowly
tailored to protecting national security.
Part III proposes a three-part solution that balances national
security needs against First Amendment rights to create
constitutionally valid NSL nondisclosure provisions. First, the issuing
authority should be permitted to issue a temporary gag order that will
expire unless the issuer goes to court and seeks judicial authorization.
Second, the issuing authority should be required to possess specific
and articulable facts that give reason to believe that disclosure of the
NSL would endanger national security. Third, gag orders should be
tailored to prohibit only disclosure of NSL-related information that
would actually endanger national security.
I. USE AND STRUCTURE OF NSLS
National security letters are one of several information-gathering
tools available to federal officials conducting national security
10
investigations. Functioning similarly to administrative subpoenas,

obligations regarding NSLs in the broader context of reporting and disclosure obligations for all
electronic surveillance laws).
10. See Sales, supra note 7, at 849 (“Section 215 is not the only tool the Executive Branch
may use to obtain documentary information in national security investigations. In addition,
there [are] . . . ‘National Security Letter,’ or ‘NSL,’ statutes.”). The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–71 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), for example,
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NSLs allow investigators to secretly gather preliminary information
11
about the target of an investigation. Although NSLs have existed in
one form or another since the 1980s, the Patriot Act greatly expanded
12
their scope and relaxed the standards by which they are issued.
Given these factors and the government’s growing focus on
13
counterterrorism investigations, the use of NSLs has dramatically
increased since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In 2000, the
14
FBI issued about 8,500 NSL requests. By 2003, that number
skyrocketed to 39,000 requests, and then jumped to 56,000 requests in
15
2004 and to 74,000 requests in 2005.

authorizes wiretaps, id. § 1802, and physical searches, id. § 1822, in national security
investigations.
11. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 1 (“A National Security Letter (NSL) seeks customer and
consumer transaction information in national security investigations from communications
providers, financial institutions and credit agencies.”).
12. See Brett A. Shumate, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Speak: The Nondisclosure Provisions
of the National Security Letter Statutes and the First Amendment Challenge, 41 GONZ. L. REV.
151, 157 (2005) (“First, the [Patriot] Act extended the use of NSLs beyond foreign counterintelligence cases to include international terrorism cases. Second, the Act relaxed the standard
by which an NSL may be issued.”).
13. Memorandum from the Gen. Counsel, FBI Nat’l Sec. Law Unit, to All Field Offices 2–
3 (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/patriot_foia/FOIA/Nov2001FBImemo.pdf
(“Given the new statutory language, the OGC and DOJ have taken the position that NSLs also
may be authorized in foreign counterintelligence (FCI) and international terrorism (IT)
preliminary inquiries . . . . The USA PATRIOT Act greatly broadened the FBI’s authority to
gather this [NSL] information.”).
14. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi. One NSL can contain multiple requests, so the total
number of requests exceeds the total number of NSLs issued. See id. at 120 (“[O]ne national
security letter may contain more than one request for information.”).
15. Id. at xvi. These numbers are likely low. In its report, the OIG discovered that in a
sample of NSLs, 17 percent of letters and 22 percent of requests went unreported, leading it to
conclude that “we believe that the total number of NSLs and NSL requests issued by the FBI
are significantly higher than the FBI reported.” Id. at 121.
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NSL provisions authorize an investigating authority to compel a
recipient to disclose certain documents for national security
investigations. Further, they prohibit the recipient from discussing the
17
existence of the NSL. Typically, the investigating authority issues an
18
NSL to an electronic-communications service provider or a financial
or consumer-credit institution and requests records containing
19
various forms of personal information. Most importantly to the
interest of secrecy, the investigating authority has the discretion to
issue a gag order prohibiting the third party from disclosing the
20
existence of the NSL. Section A briefly describes the evolution of
NSLs from a single narrow exception to a set of widely used
investigative tools. Section B describes the troubling nondisclosure
provision common to all NSLs.
A. The Evolution of the National Security Letter
Congress created the first NSL as an exception to the privacy
guarantees recognized by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
21
(RFPA). This new exception allowed a governmental authority to

16. This Note uses the FBI to represent all investigating authorities with the power to issue
NSLs. The only significant report on NSL use, by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
focused solely on the FBI’s use of the letters:
In the Patriot Reauthorization Act, enacted in 2006, Congress directed the
Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to
review “the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national
security letters issued by the Department of Justice.” . . . This report describes the
results of the first OIG review of the FBI’s use of national security letters (NSLs),
covering calendar years (CY) 2003 through 2005.
Id. at 1 (quoting USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, § 119(a), 120 Stat. 192, 219 (2006)). Additionally, all of the NSL statutes vest NSL
authority with the FBI. Therefore, this Note often refers to the FBI as the issuing authority for
NSLs, but other authorities explicitly do have NSL authority. For more information about each
of the five NSL statutes, including the agencies they cover, see infra note 31. For the purposes of
this Note, the terms “FBI,” “issuing authority,” and “investigating authority” all refer to the
government entity issuing the NSL.
17. Sales, supra note 7, at 849–50.
18. An electronic communication service is “any service which provides to users thereof
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
19. Sales, supra note 7, at 849–50. The institution affected and the information available
depends on what type of NSL is being issued. For more information about each NSL provision,
see infra note 31.
20. See Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2007) (“[T]he FBI may still ‘gag’ recipients indefinitely . . . .”).
21. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, § 1114, 92 Stat. 3697,
3707 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2006)); DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2
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request disclosure of protected financial records for national security
22
related investigations. The original provision merely permitted
rather than compelled financial institutions to disclose records, so
some financial institutions refused to comply with governmental
23
24
requests. To make the nascent NSL provision more effective,
Congress amended the RFPA to require disclosure when the FBI had
“specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
customer or entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or an
25
agent of a foreign power.” In the same session, Congress passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which
included a provision requiring communication providers to disclose
certain customer identification and transactional records to the FBI
26
for use in “foreign counterintelligence investigations.” These two
NSL statutes contain nondisclosure provisions prohibiting the
27
recipient from acknowledging the existence of the NSL. Congress
28
again added two additional NSL provisions in the 1990s, and the
Patriot Act added a fifth NSL provision and expanded three of the
29
existing NSL provisions in 2001. Thus, in less than two decades,
(referring to the initial RFPA exception and noting, “the exception was just that, an
exception”).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(1).
23. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2. Financial institutions in states with strong banking-privacy
statutes or constitutional privacy laws often refused to comply to avoid violating those state
laws. H.R. REP. NO. 99-690, at 15–16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5341, 5341–42.
24. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2–3.
25. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 404, 100 Stat.
3190, 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5) (2006)). As of 2008, the
records must be “sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A).
26. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat.
1848, 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006)).
27. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, § 1114(a)(3), 92 Stat.
3641, 3708 (1986) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3) (2006)); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 100 Stat. at 1867 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709(c)(1) (2006)).
28. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 3. Congress added NSL authority to the National Security Act
in 1994, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 802(a), 108
Stat. 3423, 3436–37 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 436 (2000)), and to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act in 1995, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-93, § 601(a), 109 Stat. 961, 974–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (2006)).
29. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 4–6. Congress added an additional NSL provision to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act in 2001. International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial AntiTerrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, § 358(g), 115 Stat. 294, 327–28 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681v (2006)). Notably, the Patriot Act expanded NSL authority by
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NSLs evolved from a single, noncompulsory exception to the RFPA
into full-fledged, codified investigative tools that allowed the FBI
30
access to customers’ financial and communication records.
The five NSL provisions function similarly but allow different
investigative authorities to obtain different types of records from
31
different organizations. All five NSL statutes have similar
nondisclosure provisions that appear to completely prohibit the

giving special agents in charge at FBI field offices authority to issue NSLs, whereas previously
only officials at FBI headquarters had such authority. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 4. It also
expanded the scope of NSLs to cover investigations of international terrorism in addition to
foreign intelligence operations. Id.
30. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2–3 (detailing the history of Congress’s expanded
implementation of NSLs).
31. For a detailed explanation of the five NSL statutes, see generally DOYLE, supra note 3.
Briefly, the five NSLs operate as follows:
The Right to Financial Privacy Act NSL allows the FBI to compel a financial institution
to produce certain financial records. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A).
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL allows the FBI to compel a “wire or
electronic communication service provider” to disclose “subscriber information and toll billing
records information, or electronic communication transactional records.” 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).
Specifically, the FBI can “request the name, address, length of service, and local and long
distance toll billing records of a person or entity.” Id. § 2709(b)(1).
The National Security Act NSL is a rather limited NSL provision that allows an
“authorized investigative agency” to request “financial records, other financial information, and
consumer reports” to investigate a federal Executive branch employee. 50 U.S.C. § 436(a).
Congress added this NSL provision to facilitate investigations of leaked classified information
following the Aldrich Ames spy scandal. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xiv. Ames, a CIA
double agent, spied for the Soviet Union and then Russia for nearly nine years and pocketed
more than $2.5 million in the process. David Johnston, How the F.B.I. Finally Caught Aldrich
Ames, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at A18.
The § 1681u NSL is part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x
(2006), and gets its name to distinguish it from another NSL included in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. The §1681u NSL requires a consumer reporting agency to provide the FBI with
“the names and addresses of all financial institutions . . . at which a consumer maintains or has
maintained an account,” id. § 1681u(a), as well as “identifying information respecting a
consumer, limited to name, addresses, former address, places of employment, or former places
of employment,” id. § 1681u(b).
The § 1681v NSL was added to the Fair Credit Reporting Act by the Patriot Act in
2001. International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001
§ 358(g), 115 Stat. at 327–28. The § 1681v NSL requires a consumer reporting agency to disclose
a requested consumer report and all other information in a person’s file if the information is
necessary to an international terrorism investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681v(a). This NSL differs
from the others in that it applies broadly to any governmental agency, not just the FBI, it
applies only to international terrorism investigations, not clandestine counterintelligence
operations, and the information must be necessary, not just relevant, to the investigation. Sales,
supra note 7, at 850–51.
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recipient from disclosing the existence of an NSL. Following two
federal court challenges to the constitutionality of the NSL
33
nondisclosure provisions, Congress amended the NSL provisions in
2006 to permit the recipient of an NSL to disclose the existence of the
request to a person necessary to comply with the request or to an
34
35
attorney and to challenge the gag order in court.
B. The National Security Letter Nondisclosure Provisions
Although the five NSL statutes apply to different situations, their
36
nondisclosure provisions are “substantively indistinguishable.” The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL’s nondisclosure
provision is characteristic of the five NSLs. It reads,
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his
designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at
Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field
office designated by the Director, certifies that otherwise there may
result a danger to the national security of the United States,
interference
with
a
criminal,
counterterrorism,
or
counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic
relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person, no
wire or electronic communications service provider, or officer,
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person (other than
those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply with the
request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with
respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
sought or obtained access to information or records under this
37
section.

This provision contains several features that give the FBI substantial
leeway to impose gag orders. First, the gag orders are self-certifying;
32. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 12; see also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (“[N]o financial
institution . . . shall disclose to any person . . . that the Government authority . . . has sought or
obtained access to a customer’s financial records.”).
33. See infra note 52.
34. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 116, 120 Stat. 192, 213–17 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18 U.S.C. and to be
codified in 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)).
35. Id. § 116, 120 Stat. at 211–13; see also, e.g., id. § 115, 120 Stat. at 211 (clarifying an NSL
recipient’s right to challenge a gag order in a United States district court), invalidated by Doe v.
Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 425 (2007).
36. Sales, supra note 7, at 852.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006).
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the FBI need only assert that disclosing the existence of the NSL
would interfere with an investigation or endanger national security to
38
issue a gag order. Additionally, the provision does not impose time
39
limits, so gag orders last indefinitely. Finally, the provision does not
require the FBI to seek judicial authorization at any point in the
process.
At the same time it modified the nondisclosure provision,
Congress added 18 U.S.C. § 3511, which explicitly allows judicial
40
review of NSLs and NSL gag orders. The statute, though, places the
41
burden of going to court on the recipient, grants a very deferential
42
standard of review, and limits how often a person may challenge an
43
NSL. If the recipient seeks review within one year, the court can set
aside or modify the gag order only if it finds “there is no reason to
believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the
United States, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations,
44
or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.” Even this
token review is limited, however, because the court must treat a
certification by the agency that disclosure might endanger national
security or interfere with diplomatic relations as conclusive unless it
45
finds that the determination was made in bad faith. If the recipient
seeks review after more than a year, the issuing agency must either
46
terminate the gag order or recertify its necessity. If the agency
recertifies, the court applies the same “no reason to believe” analysis

38. E.g., id.; see also Shankman, supra note 6, at 256 (“[Section] 2709 allows the FBI to
issue self-certified NSLs without any judicial oversight or notice, and the recipient is completely
barred from disclosure.”).
39. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 12.
40. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 115(2), 120 Stat. at
211.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (2006) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may . . .
petition . . . for an order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure requirement . . . .”).
42. Id. § 3511(b)(2) (“[T]he court may modify or set aside such a nondisclosure
requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the
national security of the United States . . . .”).
43. Id. § 3511(b)(3) (“If the court denies a petition for an order modifying or setting aside a
nondisclosure requirement under this paragraph, the recipient shall be precluded for a period of
one year from filing another petition to modify or set aside such nondisclosure requirement.”).
44. Id. § 3511(b)(2).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 3511(b)(3).
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47

as it does in a first-year challenge. Additionally, a recipient must
48
wait one year after an unsuccessful challenge before rechallenging.
Taken together, these provisions give the FBI (or any other
issuing agency) a self-certifying and self-sustaining gag order
authority. The FBI possesses nearly complete discretion in deciding
when to issue a gag order. Moreover, if the matter is challenged in
court, the FBI need only repeat its certification or offer a reason that
ties the use of the gag order to national security. Because of the
difficulty of judicial intervention, this unfettered discretion means gag
orders can last indefinitely. For the reasons discussed in Part II, such
broad and unchecked gag-order authority violates the First
Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints and content-based
restrictions of speech.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER GAG ORDERS AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND CONTENT-BASED
RESTRICTIONS
The broad discretion and blanket speech prohibitions associated
49
with NSL gag orders raise significant constitutional issues, but only
two recipients have challenged their gag orders in court, and higher
50
51
courts have yet to address the merits. In Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III),
one district court held that the Electronic Communications Privacy

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra Part I.B.
50. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005), appeal dismissed, 449
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated
sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). For a more detailed description of the
procedural history of the Doe cases, including their treatment on appeal, see infra note 52. The
strong nondisclosure language in the NSL provisions likely explains this dearth of litigation; a
party that believes it has no choice but to comply and is uncertain whether it can even consult an
attorney is unlikely to challenge a secret FBI request in court. See Nieland, supra note 20, at
1232 (“The NSLs’ impressive track record suggests an obvious truth: recipients are more likely
to comply with a demand if they feel they have little choice.”). Prior to the 2006 amendments, a
plain reading of an NSL nondisclosure provision made it appear that a recipient could not tell
anyone, including a supervisor or an attorney, about the request. See Shankman, supra note 6, at
257 (“An unsophisticated service provider may interpret this to proscribe any avenue of
challenging an NSL and, combined with the gag order, may never consult outside counsel to
discover otherwise.”).
51. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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52

Act NSL nondisclosure provision violated the First Amendment.
The court ruled that the provision was a licensing scheme lacking
53
necessary procedural safeguards and that the speech restriction was
not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in protecting a
54
national security investigation. Further, the court invalidated the §
3511 judicial-review mechanism under both the First Amendment and
the separation of powers doctrine but stayed its order pending
55
appeal.
As one of the first cases to analyze the NSL nondisclosure
provisions, the Doe III decision is informative but not conclusive. Doe
III, although partially correct, presents an incomplete analysis of the
First Amendment issues the nondisclosure provisions raise. This Part
builds from Doe III by examining three reasons that NSL
nondisclosure provisions fail in light of First Amendment prior

52. Id. at 425. Only one decision has ultimately emerged, but the history behind these
challenges is somewhat more involved. In 2004, an anonymous electronic communications
provider challenged an NSL and its accompanying gag order in the Southern District of New
York, leading to Doe I. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, Doe I, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 471 (No. 04 Civ. 02614), 2004 WL 5381887. A year later, another anonymous provider
filed suit in the District of Connecticut, leading to Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“On August 9,
2005, the plaintiffs filed suit . . . .”).
Both suits involved challenges to Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSLs issued
under § 2709, and both anonymous plaintiffs claimed First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment
violations. Id. at 69; Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475. The Doe I court held that the NSL violated
the Fourth Amendment and that the gag order violated the First Amendment. id. at 526–27.
The court enjoined the government from issuing § 2709 NSLs or enforcing gag orders, but
stayed its order pending appeal. Id. at 527. The Doe II court granted the plaintiff’s motion to
enjoin enforcement of the NSL gag order, but also stayed its order pending appeal. Doe II, 386
F. Supp. 2d at 83.
Doe I and Doe II were consolidated on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006), but during the appeal Congress amended the
NSL nondisclosure provisions and added § 3511, which specifies a judicial review process, USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 115–16, 120
Stat. 192, 211–17 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C. and to be
codified in 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded Doe I for
reconsideration under the new statutes, Gonzales, 449 F.3d at 419 (vacating as moot the Doe I
Fourth Amendment claims and vacating and remanding the First Amendment claims), and
dismissed Doe II as moot, id. at 420–21 (dismissing Doe II as moot because the government
conceded that it would not oppose the district court’s order lifting the gag order and allowing
Doe II to identify itself). On remand, the Doe I case became Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F.
Supp. 2d at 386. Although this Note does not discuss Doe I or Doe II in detail, it uses the Doe
III terminology for consistency with the federal courts.
53. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06.
54. Id. at 425.
55. Id.
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restraint and content-based restriction jurisprudence. Specifically,
Section A shows why the NSL nondisclosure provisions lack the
necessary safeguards for a licensing scheme as required by Freedman
56
v. Maryland. Section B establishes why the NSL provisions provide
the investigating authority with too much discretion. Section C
demonstrates that the nondisclosure provisions are not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.
A. Failure under the Freedman Safeguards
The Supreme Court has held that unfettered prior restraints on
speech violate the First Amendment because they prevent speech
57
before it even begins. The NSL nondisclosure provisions are classic
examples of prior restraints because they completely prohibit
recipients from talking to anyone (except their lawyers) about the
58
NSLs. In Freedman, the Supreme Court established three minimum
safeguards that any system of prior restraints must incorporate. This
Section first shows that NSL nondisclosure provisions fail to
incorporate these necessary safeguards. It then rebuts an argument
that, because recipients only learn about NSLs through involvement
in a government investigation, the Freedman safeguards do not apply.
1. NSL Nondisclosure Provisions Fail to Satisfy the Freedman
Safeguards. In Freedman, the Supreme Court held that a prior
restraint system is only constitutional if it satisfies three procedural
requirements: (1) the government must bear the burden of proving
the speech should be prohibited, (2) the initial restraint must be only
as long as necessary to allow the parties to obtain judicial review of
the government’s censorship, and (3) the review process must ensure
59
a prompt, final judicial resolution. The NSL nondisclosure
provisions comply with the second and third Freedman safeguards but
fail to satisfy the first.

56. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
57. Id. at 57–58.
58. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“The term ‘prior restraint’ is
used ‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when
issued in advance of the time that such communications occur.’” (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984))). The Alexander Court observed
that “[t]emporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually
forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.” Id.
59. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59.
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Taking the Freedman prongs out of order, NSL nondisclosure
provisions satisfy the second and third prongs of the Freedman test
because § 3511 allows recipients to challenge gag orders in a federal
60
district court at any time. Section 3511 satisfies the second prong—
requiring a short-lived initial prohibition—because it allows the
recipient to challenge the gag order the moment the recipient receives
61
it. Section 3511 satisfies the third prong—ensuring prompt, final
judicial resolution—because it specifically authorizes the recipient to
contest the gag order in federal district court. In City of Littleton v. Z.
62
J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that permitting normal
access to the courts, including the federal district courts, satisfies the
need for prompt, final judicial review in part because courts have
63
procedural tools that can accelerate proceedings when necessary.
Allowing recipients to challenge gag orders in district courts thus lets
64
recipients avail themselves of the same process Z. J. Gifts approved.
The NSL nondisclosure provisions run afoul of the first
Freedman safeguard, however, by dictating a very deferential
standard of review that strongly favors the government and by
65
requiring the recipient to initiate judicial review. Under § 3511, a
court can modify or set aside a nondisclosure order only if it “finds
that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the
national security of the United States” or otherwise interfere with an
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (2006) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may . . .
petition [a United States district court] for an order modifying or setting aside a nondisclosure
requirement . . . .”). The Doe III decision held § 3511(b) unconstitutional but declined to
address whether § 3511(b) is severable from the rest of § 3511. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
Whether this subsection is severable is largely immaterial for this discussion because this Note’s
proposed modification to the NSL nondisclosure provisions envisions prompt access to judicial
review in a manner that goes beyond § 3511(b). See infra Part III.A.
61. Cf. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60 (endorsing as a model a prior restraint scheme that held a
hearing the day after the restraint was issued).
62. City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L. L. C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004).
63. Id. at 782 (“First, ordinary court procedural rules and practices, in Colorado as
elsewhere, provide reviewing courts with judicial tools sufficient to avoid delay-related First
Amendment harm.”); Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Similarly, prompt access
to judicial review in state courts would satisfy Freedman . . . .”).
64. Although the dearth of NSL gag order litigation suggests that most NSL gag orders are
not actually reviewed by courts, the recipients at least have the opportunity to challenge them,
and this opportunity begins the moment the recipient receives the gag order. The solution
advanced in this Note, though, goes further and would guarantee judicial review of every gag
order lasting longer than a certain length of time. See infra Part III.A.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1) (“The recipient of a request for records . . . may
petition . . . .”); id. §§ 3511(b)(2)–(3) (applying a deferential “no reason to believe” standard).
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66

investigation. Thus, if the court can identify any reason whatsoever
why disclosure might hamper an investigation or threaten national
security, a very nebulous concept, it may not set aside the
nondisclosure provision. Furthermore, even if the court were
convinced that there is no reason to believe such harm would occur, a
certification by the FBI that disclosure would be harmful must be
treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was
67
made in bad faith.
Freedman places the burden of proving that the First
68
Amendment does not protect an expression on the censor. The NSL
judicial review provision stands in sharp contrast to this standard;
under § 3511(b), “the court may modify or set aside such a
nondisclosure requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe
that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United
69
70
States.” This “no reason to believe” standard is very deferential
and could conceivably force a court to uphold a nondisclosure
provision if it had any reason to believe disclosure would endanger
national security, even if the reason was tenuous and the danger
slight. Quite simply, this standard fails to satisfy the first Freedman
safeguard because it incorrectly places the burden of proof on the
NSL recipient, not the government.
The NSL judicial review provision also fails because it requires
the recipient to challenge the nondisclosure provision. Freedman held
that in the film-censoring context “the exhibitor must be assured, by
statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will,
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to
71
restrain showing the film.” Thus, Freedman places the burden of

66. Id. § 3511(b)(2).
67. See id. (“If, at the time of the petition, the [issuing authority] . . . certifies that disclosure
may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations,
such certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was
made in bad faith.”).
68. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2) (emphasis added).
70. See Christopher P. Raab, Note, Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the
Patriot Act Unduly Compromise Our Civil Liberties?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, ¶ 46,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0003.pdf (“Yet although the NSL
itself could be challenged, the court could only overturn the request if it was unreasonable or
oppressive. The case law surrounding administrative subpoenas makes it clear that a court will
rarely overturn a request on those grounds.”).
71. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58–59 (emphasis added).
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initiation on the government; the government’s alternatives are to
initiate a judicial proceeding or allow the speech. The NSL review
provision is just the opposite: “[t]he recipient of a request for
records . . . may petition . . . for an order modifying or setting aside a
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such a
72
request.” As with the allocation of the burden of proof, the
provision forcing the NSL recipient to go to court to challenge the
order is at odds with Freedman.
2. The Freedman Safeguards Apply to NSL Nondisclosure
Provisions. In one of its briefs in the Doe cases, the government
argued that information a person learns because of involvement in a
secret government investigation should be treated differently than
regular information and that NSL gag orders thus warrant less
73
rigorous protections. This distinction ultimately fails, though, and
the NSL nondisclosure provisions must satisfy Freedman.
74
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Supreme Court upheld a
judicial order prohibiting a litigant newspaper from publishing
information about the opposing party that the newspaper obtained
75
solely through discovery related to the litigation. Although the
Court held that a less-exacting scrutiny applied, it framed its analysis
76
as a tailoring issue : “In addressing [this] question it is necessary to
consider whether . . . ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms
[is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
77
particular governmental interest involved.’” The Court observed
that information gained through judicial discovery was different than
information a litigant already possessed independent of the litigation
because “control over the discovered information does not raise the
same specter of government censorship that such control might

72. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(1).
73. Brief for the Defendants-Appellants at 51–52, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.
2006), 2005 WL 5289205.
74. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
75. Id. at 32.
76. Although the Court used tailoring language, it also appears interested in comparing the
First Amendment interests impinged with the government interests at stake. See id. (“[I]t is
important to recognize the extent of the impairment of the First Amendment rights that a
protective order, such as the one at issue here, may cause.”).
77. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)).
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suggest in other situations.” In reaching this decision, the Court
considered the “substantial interest” the government had in
preventing abuse of judicial discovery and the threats to a litigant’s
79
privacy and reputation that such abuse posed.
80
The Court refined its analysis in Butterworth v. Smith, a
decision invalidating a Florida law that permanently prohibited grand
jury witnesses from disclosing their testimony even after the grand
81
jury term ended. Again reflecting a tailoring analysis, the Court
acknowledged the state’s interest in maintaining the secrecy of the
investigation but concluded that “we do not believe those interests
warrant a permanent ban on the disclosure by a witness of his own
82
testimony once a grand jury has been discharged.” The Court
pointed out the weak nexus between prohibiting disclosure even after
the grand jury disbands and the state’s interest in maintaining secret
grand jury investigations: “When an investigation ends, there is no
longer a need to keep information from the targeted individual in
order to prevent his escape—that individual presumably will have
been exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise informed
83
of the charges against him, on the other.” As it concluded its
opinion, the Court also pointed out the potential for abuse if the
government used the nondisclosure provision to silence individuals
84
with knowledge of unlawful conduct by public officials.
The Court did not mention Freedman in either the Seattle Times
Co. or the Butterworth decision. Instead, those decisions focus on
applying a tailoring analysis to the particular nondisclosure laws. This
approach is distinct from deciding whether a nondisclosure provision
satisfies procedural safeguards. In differentiating this line of cases, the
Doe III court explained that the applicability of the Freedman
safeguards depends, not on the value of the underlying speech, but
rather on “whether [the] safeguard[s] [are] essential to preventing
85
unwarranted restrictions on speech.” The focus thus should not be

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 35.
Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
Id. at 626.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 635–36.
Doe v. Gonzalez (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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on how important the speech might be, but rather on how important
safeguards are to prevent speech suppression.
The NSL nondisclosure provisions especially require safeguards
to prevent unwarranted speech restrictions. NSL recipients are
particularly poorly suited to challenge NSL nondisclosure provisions.
NSLs are issued to third parties rather than to the actual targets of an
investigation, and the third parties have little or no incentive to
86
challenge the NSL. NSL recipients can be consumer credit reporting
87
88
agencies, financial institutions, or electronic communications
89
providers, and it seems unlikely that these institutions would
willingly shoulder the time and expense of litigation and possibly
incur the ire of a powerful federal agency. Additionally, NSL
nondisclosure provisions prohibit speech about secret governmental
investigative methods—speech that only the NSL recipient is able to
90
provide. Speech about how the government uses investigative tools
such as NSLs is the type of core, political speech that lies at the heart
91
of First Amendment protection. Given that the Freedman

86. Id. at 406 (“Such a challenge would be time consuming and financially burdensome,
and . . . the NSL recipient’s business does not depend on overturning the particular form of
restriction on its speech.”).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(b) (2006) (“[A] consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying
information respecting a consumer . . . when presented with a written request . . . .”).
88. 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(1) (2000) (“Any authorized investigative agency may request from
any . . . financial institution . . . financial records . . . .”).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2006) (“A wire or electronic communication service provider shall
comply with a request for subscriber information . . . .”).
90. Although an NSL recipient is poorly situated to challenge a nondisclosure provision,
the recipient is not necessarily poorly situated to provide information about NSLs if the
nondisclosure provision were not in place. For example, a business might not wish to incur the
cost of litigation to challenge a nondisclosure provision, but the business might be interested in
producing statistics about the number of NSLs it receives each year if it were allowed to.
91. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at
the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 365 (2003))); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419 (1996) (“The government can have no compelling
interest in privileging particular subclasses of core protected speech—discussion about
economic, social and political matters—over other subclasses. All such core protected speech
‘rest[s] on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
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safeguards arose to protect potentially obscene speech, it seems
reasonable to afford the same procedural protections to political
speech about NSLs. Therefore, the Freedman safeguards seem
particularly well suited for NSL nondisclosure provisions.
B. The Issuing Authority’s Broad Discretion
Not only do the NSL nondisclosure provisions fail to incorporate
the Freedman safeguards, but they also give the issuing authority
unbridled discretion to impose prior restraints on speech.
93
Recognizing that “the censor’s business is to censor,” First
Amendment law generally discourages providing the censoring
authority with too much discretion.
Under well-established law, “objective[] and definite standards”
must guide government officials determining whether to issue a prior
94
restraint on speech. In striking down a city ordinance giving the city
commission discretion to issue a parade permit, the Supreme Court
95
cautioned in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham that the ordinance
gave the officials “virtually unbridled and absolute power” to approve
96
or reject the license. Additionally, the Court emphasized that “we
have consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an
administrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon
97
broad criteria.”
The Court struck down a similar ordinance in City of Lakewood
98
v. Plain Dealer Publishing because the law gave the city’s mayor too
99
much discretion to locate and place newspaper vending machines.
As in Shuttlesworth, the ordinance failed under First Amendment
analysis because “the face of the ordinance itself contains no explicit

92. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1965) (“Appellant sought to challenge the
constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute . . . .”).
93. Id. at 57.
94. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969). As early as 1969, the
concept that objective principles must guide a government censor or licensor was well enough
established that the Shuttlesworth Court could observe that the ordinance in question “fell
squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years” and could
cite to seventeen earlier Supreme Court decisions in support. Id. at 150, 151 n.2.
95. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
96. Id. at 150.
97. Id. at 153.
98. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
99. Id. at 772.
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limits on the mayor’s discretion . . . . [and] nothing in the law as
written requires the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it is
100
not in the public interest’ when denying a permit application.” The
Court also dismissed the government’s arguments that the mayor
would follow good-faith standards not explicitly written into the
ordinance, commenting that “this is the very presumption that the
101
doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.” As these two
cases illustrate, the Court distrusts statutes granting government
102
officials broad discretion to prohibit speech.
Despite Shuttlesworth’s and Plain Dealer Publishing’s guidance
to reign in the discretion of executive officials, the NSL nondisclosure
provisions confer the wide amount of discretion that the Court has
repeatedly rejected. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for example, the FBI can
impose a gag order merely by certifying that disclosure would
103
endanger national security or interfere with an investigation. This
requirement is akin to the situation in Plain Dealer Publishing, when
the mayor could deny a permit by simply certifying that “it is not in
104
the public interest.”
The Doe III court considered the breadth of discretion given to
the issuing authority, but ultimately—and erroneously—acquiesced to
the broad grant of discretion. Although it held that § 2709 failed the
Freedman safeguards, the Doe III court was not as troubled by the
105
provision’s broad grant of discretion. The court acknowledged
Shuttlesworth and Plain Dealer Publishing and agreed “that a
standard relating to endangering ‘national security’ is susceptible to
very broad interpretation,” but opined that statutes cannot always be
106
written with complete specificity. Observing that “[t]he context of
counterterrorism investigations requires that the FBI have a degree

100. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 770.
102. These two cases are merely representative of a rich and well-established jurisprudence
rendering statutes that give government officials unbridled discretion to restrain speech
unconstitutional. See supra note 94.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006). For a proposal that limits the FBI’s discretion without
hamstringing its investigative ability, see infra Part III.B.
104. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. at 769.
105. See Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he Court
is not persuaded that the FBI’s discretion under § 2709(c) is so unrestrained as to rise to the
level of a constitutional infirmity.”).
106. Id.
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of discretion in using NSLs,” the court deferred to the elected
107
branches’ choices on this matter of national security.
Despite consistent case law encouraging courts to closely
examine prior restraints based on broad discretion, the district court
deferred to the executive and legislative branches. The court realized
that although “the rubric of ‘national security’ has been abused on
occasion[, that] does not imply that the Court should presume the
language of ‘national security’ in § 2709(c) necessarily affords
108
unfettered discretion to the FBI likely to result in abuse.” Although,
as the court correctly acknowledged, the FBI will not necessarily
abuse its discretion, courts should not necessarily defer to the FBI
either. In fact, the court’s position essentially assumes good faith on
the part of the FBI, “[b]ut this is the very presumption that the
109
doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.”
Moreover, in a report about NSLs issued by the FBI between
2003 and 2005, the Office of the Inspector General revealed that 22
percent of the NSL files it surveyed had some sort of internal-control
110
violation not reported to the proper oversight bodies, leading the
inspector general to conclude, “[b]ased on our review and the
significant percentage of files that contained unreported possible
violations . . . we believe that a significant number of NSL-related
111
possible violations are not being identified or reported by the FBI.”
Additionally, the report found that 60 percent of the files it examined
112
contained a violation of the FBI’s internal control policy for NSLs.
Although the report made clear it found no evidence of criminal
misconduct, it seems inappropriate to defer to the FBI with such a
cursory review when the FBI routinely misuses NSL authority.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. at 770.
110. OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 78. In its review of seventy-seven representative files,
the OIG report found twenty-two possible violations, and 22 percent of those files had
violations that were not reported to the proper oversight authorities. Id. at xxxiii. The report
grouped the violations into three broad categories: improperly authorized NSLs, improper
requests under the NSL statutes, and collection of unauthorized information. Id. at xxxi. The
twenty-two violations found in the seventy-seven sampled files were nearly as many as the
twenty-six violations that the FBI identified in the entire three-year period represented by the
sampled files. Id. at xxxiii.
111. Id. at 123.
112. Id.
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The Doe III court had access to the inspector general’s report
but rationalized that “the best protection against abuse of the FBI’s
discretion in certifying nondisclosure is to ensure that such discretion
is checked by meaningful and reasonably expeditious judicial
114
review.” Although the district court’s holding required stronger and
more immediate judicial review, the Supreme Court observed in Plain
Dealer Publishing that “[e]ven if judicial review were relatively
speedy, such review cannot substitute for concrete standards to guide
115
the decisionmaker’s discretion.”
By yielding to the FBI’s national security claim, the Doe III court
abdicated its responsibility to hold the FBI and all other NSL-issuing
authorities’ discretion to the strict standards that Shuttlesworth and
Plain Dealer Publishing require. In practice, the NSL provisions
permit the issuing authority to impose a permanent gag order merely
by claiming a vague national security interest. This grants the issuing
authority too much discretion, intruding too far into First
116
Amendment rights.
C. NSL Restrictions Are Not Narrowly Tailored to the Government’s
National Security Interest
In addition to granting the FBI too much discretion and failing to
properly incorporate the Freedman safeguards, the NSL
nondisclosure provisions fail to narrowly tailor gag orders to the
government’s interest in maintaining security. The NSL nondisclosure
provisions fail this narrow tailoring requirement because they can last
indefinitely—well beyond the point at which disclosure would still
implicate national security interests—and because they prohibit all
speech, not merely speech that would threaten the government’s
interest in national security.
An NSL gag order is by definition a content-based restriction on
117
speech; an NSL recipient with a gag order cannot talk about the
113. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (referring to and citing the OIG report).
114. Id. at 409.
115. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750, 771 (1988).
116. See Aditi A. Prabhu, Contracting for Financial Privacy: The Rights of Banks and
Customers Under the Reauthorized Patriot Act, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 51, 59 (2007) (“[T]he NSL
issuance process involves few procedural safeguards to balance individual privacy against
competing governmental interests.”).
117. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“The speech in
question is defined by its content; and the statute which seeks to restrict it is content based.”).

EYINK IN FINAL[1].DOC

2008]

11/16/2008 10:05:58 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL SECRECY

495

118

NSL. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict
scrutiny, and the restriction must be narrowly tailored to promote a
119
compelling government interest.
Under narrow tailoring, the
government must use the least restrictive means available to meet its
purpose, which means a content-based restriction is unconstitutional
120
if the legislature has overlooked a less restrictive approach.
The Doe III court took issue with the permanency of the gag
orders, commenting that “it is hard to conceive of any circumstances
121
that would justify a permanent bar on disclosure.” Because gag
122
orders can last indefinitely, the nondisclosure provision’s duration
has only a weak nexus with the government’s compelling interest—
protecting national security. Accordingly, the nondisclosure
provisions are not narrowly tailored because they can remain in place
long beyond the time needed to protect national security or the
123
integrity of an investigation. Instead, rather than being narrowly
tailored to minimally impact speech, the nondisclosure provisions can
permanently prohibit the citizens arguably most qualified to discuss
124
the use and effects of NSLs from entering the public debate.
Moreover, the nondisclosure provisions identify national
security, the integrity of investigations, diplomatic relations, and
protecting individuals from harm as the compelling interests being
125
protected. But the provisions prohibit all speech, and a blanket

118. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL, for example, generally prohibits a
recipient from disclosing the existence of the NSL:
If the [investigating authority] certifies that otherwise there may result a danger to
the national security of the United States . . . no wire or electronic communications
service provider . . . shall disclose to any person (other than those to whom such
disclosure is necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain legal
advice or legal assistance with respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records under this
section.
18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006); see also text accompanying notes 36–38.
119. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813.
120. See id. (“If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative.”).
121. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
122. See id. at 420 (“For example, an NSL recipient cannot communicate to anyone
indefinitely that it received an NSL . . . .”).
123. Id. at 422.
124. See id. at 420 (“NSL recipients are effectively barred from engaging in any discussion
regarding their experiences and opinions related to the government’s use of NSLs.”).
125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006) (allowing a blanket gag order when there is “a
danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal,
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prohibition does not seem to be the least restrictive means to protect
these interests. A large communications provider, for example, might
receive thousands of NSLs, and thus revealing aggregate information
about NSLs would not jeopardize national security or an ongoing
investigation. Because NSL nondisclosure provisions prohibit speech
that does not threaten these government interests, the provisions fail
narrow tailoring in this regard as well.
III. RECONCILING NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
NSL gag orders address real national security concerns, and they
can meet constitutional standards. But existing NSL nondisclosure
provisions conflict with important First Amendment rights.
Ultimately, the issue becomes how to structure a constitutionally
valid NSL gag order—one that allows the government to effectively
investigate threats to national security while also protecting each
citizen’s right to speak freely and to participate in public debate. To
reconcile NSL nondisclosure provisions with First Amendment
jurisprudence, the provisions must (1) incorporate the Freedman
safeguards, (2) ensure that issuing authorities do not have unfettered
discretion, and (3) narrowly tailor gag orders to prohibit the least
amount of speech for the shortest duration. A constitutional
nondisclosure provision would require the government to seek
judicial authorization after an initial grace period, to possess specific
reasons for issuing the gag order, and to craft gag orders that account
for the recipients’ individual situations.
A. Shifting the Burden of Seeking Judicial Review to the Government
Complying with the Freedman safeguards requires prompt
judicial review, limited restraints until a final judicial decision, and a
burden on the government to seek such review and to prove the
126
necessity of the restraint. As the Doe III court observed, immediate

counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or
danger to the life or physical safety of any person”).
126. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (“First, the burden of proving
that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. . . . [Second,] the censor will,
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film.
[Third, a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must
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access to regular judicial proceedings satisfies the first two
127
safeguards. The third safeguard could be met either by requiring the
issuing authority to seek judicial authorization before issuing the NSL
or by allowing a government authority to issue an NSL with a
temporary gag order but requiring the authority to seek judicial
review within a specified time frame.
The first option—requiring prior judicial authorization—likely
swings the balance too far the other way, overfavoring First
Amendment rights relative to the government’s interest in
128
maintaining secrecy in national security–related investigations.
After all, even the Freedman Court acknowledged that speech could
129
be temporarily restrained while awaiting judicial review.
Additionally, such a requirement would prevent the government from
using NSLs as preliminary screening and background informationgathering tools to generate information for Foreign Intelligence
130
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) requests. Instead, the second
option—allowing the issuing authority to issue a temporary gag order
and then requiring that authority to either drop the gag order or seek
authorization from a court—effectively balances the government’s
need to investigate without alerting the suspect or exposing its
sources and methods with the recipient’s First Amendment

similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible
with sound judicial resolution.”).
127. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (“‘[P]rompt access to judicial review in state courts’
would satisfy the first two Freedman protections. This conclusion holds true with respect to
judicial review in federal courts as well.” (citation omitted) (quoting Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117,
129 (2d Cir. 1999))).
128. See id. at 406 (“That the government bears the burden of justifying the need for
nondisclosure to a court does not mean that the FBI must obtain the approval a court prior to
issuing an NSL with a nondisclosure order.”).
129. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (“Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial
determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.”).
130. See OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at xxii (“FBI personnel reported that the principal
objectives for using NSLs are to: . . . establish evidence to support Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for
electronic surveillance, physical searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders . . . .”). This use is
a significant benefit to FBI agents when initially trying to develop a case because FISA
surveillance, which is more invasive than an NSL request, typically requires preauthorization
from the FISA court. See Sales, supra note 7, at 841 (“With a few exceptions, the government
may not engage in these sorts of surveillance without submitting an application to and receiving
approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . .”).
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131

concerns.
This second option would allow the investigating
authority to covertly gather enough preliminary information to seek
132
authorization for more invasive surveillance, while ultimately still
133
allowing the NSL recipient to join public debate about NSLs.
Moreover, this solution would still allow the recipient to challenge the
gag order at any point; the recipient would have the option to
challenge the order, but the government would bear the burden of
going to court to maintain it.
As the Doe III court suggested, any temporary gag order must be
limited in duration, and the issuing authority must be required to
either seek authorization from a court to maintain the gag order or
134
rescind the gag order within a specified time period. This initial time
period must be short enough to ensure that the recipient can still
meaningfully engage in the public discourse but long enough to
protect the government’s national security interests. Congress likely
has access to classified information about NSL investigations that
shows how long the government needs to obtain and process
information from an NSL request. Congress could then limit initial
NSL gag orders to this length of time. If the investigation pans out,
the court could grant a longer-lasting (but finite) gag order, thus
135
protecting national security and the integrity of the investigation. If
the investigation turns up nothing, the recipient would be free to
discuss the NSL after that initial period.
The fixed time period and guaranteed judicial review also
compensate for the lack of incentive for most NSL recipients to
challenge a gag order. As the Doe III court observed, most NSL
recipients lack incentives to expend either the time or money
136
necessary to fight a gag order. Therefore, although the recipient
131. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“Allowing the FBI to issue nondisclosure orders for
a limited period of time prior to any judicial oversight balances the strong First Amendment
concerns at issue with the FBI’s need to act quickly in conducting counterterrorism
investigations.”).
132. See supra note 130.
133. Additionally, investigating authorities may be less likely to issue baseless or abusive
NSLs if they know that the recipients will eventually be able to discuss the NSLs.
134. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“[T]he FBI may issue a temporary nondisclosure
order on its own in accordance with the standards set forth in § 2709(c), provided that, within a
reasonable and brief period of time, it must either notify the NSL recipient that the order is no
longer in effect, or justify to a court the need for a continued period of nondisclosure.”).
135. For a discussion of the duration of a court-authorized gag order, see infra Part III.C.
136. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
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would remain free to challenge the gag order at any point, even
137
within the initial temporary period, the judicial process would
ensure that all gag orders receive judicial review and comply with the
138
First Amendment.
B. The Issuing Authority Must Have Objective Guidelines when
Issuing Gag Orders
As established in Shuttlesworth and its progeny, an official
empowered to determine whether to issue a gag order must be guided
139
by “narrow, objective, and definite standards.” Although an issuing
authority needs leeway to effectively respond to national security
threats, its discretion cannot be so broad that baldly claiming a
140
national security concern can justify banning speech.
Congress could strike an appropriate balance by reviving the
discarded “articulable facts” standard—which, prior to the Patriot
Act, the government had to meet before issuing an NSL—and
141
imposing that standard on NSL gag orders. Under this revived
“articulable facts” standard, the investigating authority could impose
a gag order as long as it had specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that disclosure of the NSL would endanger national
security, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or

137. See id. at 406 (“This observation does not imply, however, that an NSL recipient may
not, at any time, also petition a court to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order . . . .”).
138. Cf. Timothy Edgar & Witold Walczak, Perspectives on the USA Patriot Act: We Can Be
Both Safe and Free: How the Patriot Act Threatens Civil Liberties, 76 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 21, 27
(2005) (“Congress should enact legislation providing an ability to challenge a NSL in court, and
limiting the time period for the secrecy provision that applies to all such letters.”).
139. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
140. Under the standard nondisclosure provisions, the FBI or a designee need only certify
the disclosure “may result [in] a danger to the national security” or interfere with an
investigation. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). But see New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“The word ‘security’ is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law
embodied in the First Amendment.”).
141. Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, to issue an NSL the director of the FBI or a
designee had to certify that “there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that
the person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.” E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 505(a)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 365 (2001).
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counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations,
142
or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.
Although the specific and articulable facts standard determines
whether certain searches are unconstitutional under the Fourth
143
Amendment, it would function equally well to evaluate whether an
investigating authority possesses and has produced specific evidence
establishing why a gag order is required. This evidence would have to
be relatively specific, but by no means conclusive, as to the threat
144
posed by disclosure of the NSL. In United States v. Perrine, for
example, the Tenth Circuit applied the specific and articulable facts
standard to a government request for computer records as part of a
145
child pornography investigation. Under the statute at issue in
Perrine, the government had to “offer[] specific and articulable facts
showing that there [were] reasonable grounds to believe” that the
146
information sought would further the investigation.
The
government produced an affidavit that described an officer’s
interview with a man who reported being sent child pornography in
an internet chat room and that indicated the officer had viewed the
chat room log, but the affidavit did not contain the actual text of the
chat room log or any indication that the suspect in the investigation
147
had been logged into his internet account when the chat occurred.
Applying the specific and articulable facts standard, the court held
that despite the missing chat room logs and lack of verification that
the suspect was logged into his account at the time, “[t]he details
provided are specific and certainly would lead to a reasonable
142. Cf. id. (allowing the FBI to request information when “there are specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the information
sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”); see also supra text
accompanying note 25. Note, though, that although this language is drawn from the pre–Patriot
Act Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL, it would not be used in this proposal as it was
used in the old statute. Rather, the issuing authority would have to possess specific and
articulable facts that a gag order is required to protect national security.
143. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
144. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008). Perrine concerned a
government request for computer records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which is another criminal
investigatory tool included in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, id. at 1201–02, but
which is distinct from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL discussed in this Note.
145. Id. at 1201–03.
146. Id. at 1202 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
147. Id. at 1202–03.
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suspicion that [the suspect] was involved in child pornography.”
Thus, as the Perrine example shows, the specific and articulable facts
standard requires some degree of specificity but does not require
anything resembling conclusive proof.
This standard directly addresses one concern that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly voiced, namely that an official could stifle
speech with a mere assertion that the speech violated some vague
149
standard. Instead, the official would have to possess specific and
articulable facts linking the speech to the danger sought to be
150
avoided. Although this standard would strengthen the nexus
151
required to issue a gag order, it is far from impossible to meet. An
official would not need overwhelming evidence or even a
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the official would need some
specific facts, ensuring that the government did not make the decision
to institute the gag order arbitrarily or speculatively, and the facts
would need to give the official a reason to believe the harm would
occur, ensuring a lower threshold of credibility for the nexus between
the facts and the harm.
C. The Court Must Narrowly Tailor the Gag Order to Minimize the
Restraint
The gag order must be narrowly tailored to last only as long as
necessary and to preclude only the necessary speech. In aptly
identifying the overbreadth of the nondisclosure provision, the Doe
III court observed that
an NSL recipient cannot communicate to anyone indefinitely that it
received an NSL, the identity of the target, the type of information
that was requested and/or provided, general statistical information
such as the number of NSLs it received in the previous month or
year, its opinion as to whether a particular NSL was properly issued

148. Id. at 1203.
149. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988) (“[N]othing
in the law as written requires the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it is not in the
public interest’ when denying a permit application.”).
150. There is a very real possibility that disclosing the specific and articulable facts
themselves might jeopardize national security or the government’s investigation, but the facts
would at least exist in a documented form for a judge to review in camera if necessary.
151. See Edgar & Walczak, supra note 138, at 22 (“Historically, judges rarely refuse warrant
requests.”).
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in accordance with the applicable criteria, or perhaps even its
152
opinion about the use of NSLs generally.

This passage reveals two concerns at work: the indefinite time period
and the broad subject matter of the gag orders. This Section first
addresses the temporal component and then turns to the subjectmatter component.
The Doe III court made clear that a permanent prohibition on
disclosure is unacceptable under the First Amendment: “[I]t is hard
to conceive of any circumstances that would justify a permanent bar
153
on disclosure.”
Not only is a permanent bar on disclosure
unconstitutional, but extending the prohibition longer than necessary
to protect the national security interest is also unconstitutional: “[The
one year moratorium on rechallenging the gag order] is not narrowly
tailored because it may call for the period of nondisclosure to extend
154
substantially beyond the time that national security necessitates.”
Therefore, the issuing authority and then the court must craft a gag
order that only lasts as long as necessary to protect the government’s
asserted interest. Such an order could also include automatic
termination provisions if the suspect is apprehended, killed, or
exonerated, for example. If Congress adapts the “specific and
155
articulable” standard, the court could consider the government’s
specific facts when determining the length of the gag order.
In addition to narrowly tailoring the duration of the gag order, a
court should also tailor the content of the gag order when possible.
Although the Doe III court did not directly address this issue, it
seems reasonable that the most narrowly tailored nondisclosure
provisions should allow the recipient as much speech as possible given
156
the government’s concerns about the effect of disclosure.
152. Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
153. Id. at 421.
154. Id. at 422.
155. See supra Part III.B.
156. See Edgar & Walczak, supra note 138, at 28 (“While narrowly-tailored authority for the
government to prevent disclosure of information that would truly affect national security is
warranted, Congress should require that such authority be subject to judicial approval on a caseby-case basis.”); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1360 (2004) (“[D]isclosure might be permitted where the record holder
reasonably believes that the disclosure would not reveal information detailed enough to
materially assist the targets of an investigation.”). In their articles surveying the national
security law landscape, Edgar, Walczak, and Professor Swire briefly mention tailoring the scope
of NSL gag orders. This Note expands on their suggestions.
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Gag orders could affect a range of the recipient’s speech
interests, from identifying the target of a secret investigation to
offering a general opinion about NSLs. A narrowly tailored
nondisclosure provision should recognize and react to the differences
157
between the speech interests along this spectrum. For example, if
disclosing the identity of the target of the investigation would
interfere with the investigation, but acknowledging that the recipient
electronic communications service provider had received at least one
NSL during the past year would not, the gag order should account for
158
that difference whenever possible. One can imagine this approach
working fairly well when the recipient is an officer of a large
communications company that functions as an electronic
159
communications service provider with a significant customer base. If
the officer reveals the receipt of an NSL, the service provider would
likely have too many customers for the target of the investigation to
recognize the situation. Accordingly, the gag order for NSLs sent to
that officer should reflect this reality and perhaps allow the officer to
disclose annual statistics about the number of NSLs received in a
yearly summary, to discuss thoughts about the efficacy of the NSL
program, or to share impressions on the propriety of the NSLs being
160
issued.
By requiring narrow tailoring of gag orders to minimize the
duration of the gag order and the content covered, Congress could
properly balance the competing interests of freedom of expression
157. One might properly identify this as a content-based restriction on speech. The Doe III
court correctly noted, however, that a complete ban on speech is already a content-based
restriction. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (“[T]he amended § 2709(c) continues to act as a
content-based restriction on speech. . . . [A]lthough . . . neutral with respect to viewpoint, it
nonetheless functioned as a content-based restriction because it closed off an ‘entire topic’ from
public discourse.” (quoting Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006))). If one accepts that under some circumstances a gag order
can ban all speech about an NSL, then modifying that same gag order to ban only some speech
about an NSL should not be a problem.
158. See Swire, supra note 156, at 1360 (“There could be rules about the scope of disclosure,
with permission perhaps to report the mere existence of a request without authorization to
disclose the nature of the request.”).
159. This hypothetical corporate officer could be the recipient of an Electronic
Communications Privacy Act NSL under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006).
160. Content tailoring becomes more difficult when the number of potential targets
decreases. If the recipient is instead the operator of a very small local communications network
with one hundred customers, the gag order may have to be adjusted to only permit disclosure
anonymously or to only permit discussion of the operator’s general impressions of the NSL
program as a citizen, not as a recipient.
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and national security and ensure that one is not sacrificed for the
other.
CONCLUSION
NSL nondisclosure provisions, even in light of the 2006
amendments and in the wake of the Doe III decision,
unconstitutionally prohibit recipients from exercising their First
Amendment right to participate in the public debate about NSLs. In
particular, the provisions fail three key First Amendment
requirements. First, they restrain speech without providing the proper
procedural safeguards to ensure prompt judicial review by forcing the
recipient to shoulder the burden of seeking review and by imposing a
very deferential standard of review. Second, the provisions vest too
much discretion with the issuing authority by only requiring the issuer
to certify that disclosure “may result [in] a danger to the national
161
security of the United States.” Third, the provisions authorize gag
orders that are not narrowly tailored to the harm sought to be
prevented because they permit gag orders that both outlast the threat
to national security and restrict a broader range of speech than
necessary.
This Note proposes a three-part solution that would create
constitutional NSL nondisclosure provisions. First, the issuing
authority should be permitted to issue a short, temporary gag order
that expires unless the issuer goes to court and shoulders the burden
of proof to seek judicial authorization. The recipient would still be
able to challenge the gag order during this initial period. This
component would address the Freedman deficiency and ensure that
all NSLs receive prompt judicial review. Second, the issuing authority
should be required to possess specific and articulable facts that give
reason to believe that disclosure of the NSL would endanger national
security, interfere with an investigation, or cause one of the other
harms listed in the nondisclosure provisions. This requirement would
hold the issuing authority to a higher standard and prevent the
government from imposing gag orders under the broad umbrella of
national security. Finally, gag orders should be tailored to only
prohibit disclosure of NSL-related information that would actually
lead to one of the harms listed in the nondisclosure provisions. Such

161. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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tailoring would prevent gag orders both from lasting longer than
necessary and from completely barring the recipient from the public
debate about NSLs.
This three-part solution addresses the constitutional deficiencies
in NSL nondisclosure provisions while also ensuring that the
government has the necessary tools available to combat terrorism.
Although the first component shifts the burden of obtaining review to
the government, it also permits the government to quickly respond to
new threats by including a grace period before requiring judicial
authorization. The second component raises the gag order threshold
from mere conjecture and blanket statements to specific and concrete
facts but still allows the government leeway to issue gag orders when
it can articulate that need. The third component permits gag orders
that protect investigations but requires the government to tailor those
orders to only minimally invade the constitutional rights of its
citizens.
This delicate balancing reflects the careful analysis often
required when the government attempts to curtail a civil liberty in the
interest of national security. The anonymous author quoted at the
beginning of this Note observed,
I recognize that there may sometimes be a need for secrecy in
certain national security investigations. But I’ve now been under a
broad gag order for three years, and other NSL recipients have been
silenced for even longer. At some point—a point we passed long
162
ago—the secrecy itself becomes a threat to our democracy.

On the one hand, a nation must provide security to protect its
citizens’ hard-fought liberties; on the other hand, without preserving
those hard-fought liberties, a nation is not worth protecting.

162. Anonymous, supra note 1.

